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Experience’s Potential and Potential Experiences: 
Subjectivity, Alterity, and Futurity  
in the Late-Apartheid Novels of  Nadine Gordimer
This article begins by scrutinizing divergent critical views of  Gordimer’s subject position 
and authorial agency, which locate her variously on a spectrum ranging from liberal-
humanist autonomy to historical-materialist determinism. It then considers how Gor-
dimer’s nonfiction articulates a parallel ambivalence about the reach of  the writer’s imagination 
(and its dependence on “the potential of  his own experience”), particularly regarding the ethics 
and feasibility of  creating racially “other” characters. Its main part reads July’s People (1981), in 
relation to other Gordimer novels, as a similarly self-reflexive engagement with subjectivity and 
alterity: the otherness of  the imagined future (a “potential experience”) facilitates fresh socio- 
political perspectives, even as the novel expresses philosophical scepticism about such imagina-
tive extrapolation and its textual representation. The article concludes with a new reading of  the 
novel’s “open” ending as a projection of  this epistemological conflict.
Subjectivity: Gordimer’s Late-Apartheid Critics
By place I don’t mean a predetermined place […]. You 
are consciously or unconsciously creating a position in 
your society. (Gordimer, in Gray 180)
Amongst the proliferation of  literary criticism on Gordimer produced between the 
publication of  July’s People (1981) and South Africa’s transition to democracy (1994) are 
two major books that offer contrasting conceptions of  Gordimer’s subject position 
and authorial agency: Stephen Clingman’s benchmark The Novels of  Nadine Gordimer: 
History from the Inside (1986), which elucidates the linear development of  Gordimer from 
“liberal” to “radical,” hinging on The Late Bourgeois World (1966); and Kathrin Wagner’s 
iconoclastic Rereading Nadine Gordimer (1994), which refutes this historical linearity. 
Clingman reads Gordimer’s novels as articulating a “history from the inside” in the dual 
sense that Gordimer is writing from the midst of  the history she is describing even as it 
shapes her inner consciousness (and those of  her historically embedded protagonists): 
“At the same time as she engages with history she is moulded by the patterns and forces 
she must try to assess” (2). He gives Gordimer much credit, both for the sensitivity with 
which she registers the nuances of  her times and for her unrelentingly tough examina-
tion of  her own relation to these times; Gordimer, he points out, “has never let up on 
herself  ideologically” (26). In this view, Gordimer, like Helen Shaw at the end of  The 
Lying Days (1953) – the autobiographical Bildungsroman with which Gordimer made her 
novelistic debut – has at every stage been resolved to accept “disillusion as a beginning 
rather than an end” (367). Nevertheless, Clingman acknowledges that Gordimer’s “his-
tory from the inside” is “not only privileged but also confined by its ‘inside’ position” 
(2). Gordimer’s perspective, he argues, is doubly limited, socially and temporally, by 
her “split position” (206) as a dissident yet privileged white in apartheid South Africa: 
her novels are implicitly addressed to black South Africans and to a post-revolutionary 
future, from both of  which she was cut off  by apartheid.
This liberal-radical teleology, which necessarily deferred much to a third, liberat-
ed phase, was subsequently nuanced by Judie Newman’s concise chronological study 
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(1988), which foregrounded the “conditioning factor […] of  gender” and “the relation 
of  genre to gender” (17). But the pre-eminence of  racial politics as an interpretive 
framework had already been problematized by John Cooke’s monograph The Novels of  
Nadine Gordimer: Private Lives/Public Landscapes (1985), which considered Gordimer’s 
“major theme” to be “the liberation of  children from unusually possessive mothers” 
(10) and her secondary concern its intertwining with the liberation of  black South Afri-
cans from the repressive state. This wasn’t quite “history from the outside,” but it did 
de-privilege history by re-casting the “public” as an adjunct to the “private.” With post-
apartheid hindsight, Michael Chapman (1996) similarly asserted that “[i]t is debatable 
whether Gordimer has produced many political novels that are not, at core, something 
more domestic: Freudian family romances” (235); and, reviewing Gordimer’s career 
after her death in 2014, Jeanne-Marie Jackson (2015) even suggested that “we might 
read Gordimer’s oeuvre as a single Bildungsroman that unfolds its own inversion; in other 
words, a coming-of-age narrative that results in individual sublimation or undoing” 
(55).
Like Clingman, however, Wagner privileges the category of  “history,” but considers 
the novels to be more fundamentally limited – and, indeed, seriously flawed – by Gordi-
mer’s subject position, and by Gordimer’s own underestimation of  its constraints. Wag-
ner argues that Gordimer’s “necessary entrapment in both class and historical moment 
in South Africa makes her unavoidably vulnerable to the unconscious inscription of  its 
stereotypes and clichés” (70). While acknowledging Gordimer’s ideological vigilance, 
she distinguishes between Gordimer’s narrow conception of  ideology as “the clearly 
articulated programmes of  particular groups with specific social, political and economic 
agendas” (29), which reflect “overt cognitive structures,” and the “covert emotional 
structures” that often conflict with these at the level of  the text (225; cf. v). Gordimer’s 
novels, Wagner argues, at a subtextual level more often than not confirm the apartheid 
orthodoxy they strive to confront, and ultimately succumb to the white repressions they 
are at pains to confess:
Much of  the fiction can be read as paradoxically confirming the deepest nightmares of  
the beleaguered white imagination, and as supporting at a subtextual level precisely those 
conservative fears and prejudices which oppose change, and which the surface rhetoric 
of  the texts implicitly challenges. (47)
While the “gradual politicisation” in response to an evolving regime (on which Cling-
man focuses) is registered at the surface level of  the text, Wagner thus emphasizes 
“extraordinary continuities of  perspective” informing Gordimer’s deepest responses to 
“the essentially unchanging immoral framework of  apartheid” (164; cf. 41). Clingman’s 
understating of  these continuities Wagner attributes to what she considers his failure to 
problematize the general concept of  “history” (235n), and especially to his underestima-
tion of  the subjective nature of  Gordimer’s particular version of  South African history 
– a version which Wagner regards as over-expository in extent while sketchy and clichéd 
in content, and as therefore explaining the lack of  domestic enthusiasm for Gordimer’s 
work relative to her lionization abroad (8, 33, 56). This hermeneutic contrast is reflected 
in the ways in which the studies are structured, for whereas Clingman’s chapters are 
chronological, Wagner’s are thematic. Thus while for Clingman Gordimer’s fiction is 
expressive of  a developing perspective from an evolving subject position, for Wagner it 
is fundamentally predetermined by an essentially fixed position, every attempt to tran-
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scend which results in its (often unconscious) codified transcription. Where Clingman 
sees modulation and progression, Wagner sees permutation and proliferation.
Perhaps the most significant feature of  Wagner’s analysis is the inevitability she detects 
in Gordimer’s writing (Gordimer’s historical “entrapment” making her “unavoidably” 
predisposed to stereotypes), which contrasts markedly with the constrained agency that 
Clingman diagnoses. On the one hand (Clingman), subjectivity is considered essentially 
active, operating like a verb – what is seen and described is the subject of, constituted by, 
and understood in relation to, the writer; on the other hand (Wagner), subjectivity is dee-
med fundamentally passive, functioning as a noun – what is seen and described is sub-
ject to, constituted of, and understood as relative to, the writer. This bifurcation reflects 
contrasting conceptions of  writing: on the first view, a heuristic process undertaken 
from an evolving position; on the second, a predestined product of an essentially static 
position. In essence, whereas Clingman reads Gordimer’s fiction as strongly influenced, 
but not determined, by her privileged position as a white in apartheid society, Wagner 
reads Gordimer’s fiction as wholly determined by this position. While Clingman’s read-
ing could thus be considered a nuanced iteration of  the once-popular image of  Gor-
dimer as apartheid South Africa’s conscience, Wagner’s reading reduces Gordimer to 
something for which apartheid is responsible.
Of  the post-apartheid books devoted to Gordimer’s apartheid-era fiction, perhaps 
most notable is Ileana Dimitriu’s Art of  Conscience (2000), a revisionist “‘counter- 
chronological’ reading” (27) animated by a “revindicated humanism” (18) that “permit[s] 
Gordimer a greater command of  her own story and her own autonomy than Clingman 
[or] Wagner” (17). While it might be argued that Gordimer is less autonomous than 
Dimitriu suggests, and her failings greater than Clingman allows but lesser than Wagner 
insists, what interests me here is that the tensions between these readings, which seek 
to locate Gordimer on a spectrum ranging from liberal-humanist autonomy to histori-
cal-materialist determinism, mirror Gordimer’s own engagement with her subject posi-
tion over the preceding decades, an engagement apparent in her ambivalence about the 
reach of  the writer’s imagination.
Subjectivity and Alterity: Gordimer’s Nonfiction
“How could it be true, that which both of  us knew – that he was me, and I was him? […] 
how could I recognize my situation in his?” (Gordimer, A World of  Strangers 252)
“Exploitation, which the blacks experience as their reality, […] the white artist […] 
experiences […] through a moral attitude or a rational empathy.” (Gordimer, “Relevance” 
139, author’s emphasis)
In her “Introduction” to No Place Like: Selected Stories (1975), Gordimer expressed an en-
during belief  that the writer is gifted with “[p]owers of  observation heightened beyond 
the normal” (12): for her, the writer is cognitively androgynous (a belief  with which her 
feminist critics take issue) and imaginatively promiscuous, a “strange creature who can 
get into the skin of  all sexes, all ages” (Marchant, Kitchen, and Rubin 261) and move 
“deep under the surface of  human lives” by virtue of  having “at least some faculties of  
supra-observation and hyperperception not known to others” (“Living” 277). Never-
theless, Gordimer has always been aware of  the limits to empathetic perception that 
inhere in every human relationship, however close. For example, in a moving essay 
written in memory of  the black writer Nat Nakasa (a close friend who left South Africa 
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on an exit permit to study at Harvard, and in 1965 committed suicide), Gordimer writes 
with a consciousness of  the limits of  empathy at the forefront of  her mind:
So do the limits of  human relationships constantly fling us back; so do one’s hands fall, 
helpless, before the quintessential loneliness of  each human being. It is keeping this 
in mind that I write of  him, respecting the ultimate despair that took him beyond the 
understanding of  friends, aware that what each of  us knows of  him was only part of  
what he was, and lived, and suffered, and that even when we have put it all together there 
will always be something – perhaps the unbearable sum of  the total in itself ? – that he 
kept to himself  and died of. (“One Man” 80)
The contrast between this reverential helplessness before the limits of  empathy and the 
audacious disdain of  the creative artist for such limits, points up a suggestive ambiguity 
in Gordimer’s descriptions of  the writer’s peculiar “powers of  observation”: in what 
sense are these powers “beyond” the normal? On the one hand, Gordimer seems to be 
describing the writer as differing from her fellow human beings only in terms of  the 
degree to which she has developed a common faculty of  observation: her “powers of  
observation” are “heightened beyond the normal” (emphasis added). On the other hand, 
these “powers of  observation” derive from a faculty essentially different from “the nor-
mal”: Gordimer seems to be describing the writer as a breed apart, a specially evolved 
“strange creature,” “looking pretty much like other human beings” but possessed of  
– even possessed by – “faculties of  supra-observation and hyperperception not known 
to others” (“Living” 277). Acknowledgement that the writer shares a universal human 
limitation is set aside, and she asserts differences of  degree and kind.
As is implicit in Gordimer’s elegy for Nakasa, this ambivalence about the nature, and 
consequently the reach, of  the empathetic imagination was increased by apartheid. As 
Wagner points out, Gordimer’s
characteristically humanist belief  in that fundamental brotherhood of  man which allows 
the artist to enter imaginatively into the life of  the other, regardless of  gender, creed or 
colour, quickly found itself  at odds with the political argument that, within the specific 
contexts of  the resistance struggle, such an appropriation of  the experience of  the 
“Other” was unacceptably arrogant. (116)
Just as Africanists within the ANC, and advocates of  the Black Consciousness that 
emerged from the late 1960s, felt it patronizing for liberal whites to represent (speak 
on behalf  of) blacks politically, so it was felt by many that it was inappropriate, even 
exploitative, for white writers to represent (portray) black characters. At the same time, 
failing to engage with black politics or excluding black characters was arguably complicit 
with apartheid. Gordimer thus found herself  in an invidious double-bind familiar to 
white South African liberal activists and writers alike. In her political nonfiction, this is 
acutely reflected in a statement – which Clingman justly describes as one of  “extraor-
dinary vulnerability and toughness” (“Introduction” 7) – towards the end of  her 1979 
address on “Relevance and Commitment”:
Although I am white and fully aware that my consciousness inevitably has the same 
tint as my face, when I have spoken of  white attitudes and opinions I have not taken it 
upon myself  to speak for whites, but have quoted attitudes and opinions expressed by 
whites themselves, or manifest (in my opinion) in their work. When I have spoken of  
black attitudes and opinions, I have not taken it upon myself  to speak for blacks, but 
have quoted attitudes and opinions expressed by blacks themselves or (in my opinion) 
manifest in their work. (143)
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Her essays and interviews (and, of  course, her interviewers) are preoccupied with the 
related issue of  whether it is politically appropriate to create black characters in fic-
tion, but also with the question of  whether she is imaginatively able to do it credibly. 
In her 1961 essay “The Novel and the Nation in South Africa” Gordimer considered 
that “there is little reason why a straightforward novel of  events in which the protago-
nists are black men should not be written just as authentically by a white writer as by 
a black one” (44). However, with the entrenchment of  apartheid and the rise of  Black 
Consciousness, she becomes less sure, and in a 1972 note appended to the essay consid-
ered that “changes in South Africa since 1961” have so restricted blacks’ and whites’ 
experiences of  each other, and so widened the gulf  between separate black experience 
and white experience, as to restrict the areas of  black life about which white authors are 
capable of  writing: 
[…] I now believe that George Lukács is right when he says that a writer, in imaginative 
creation and the intuition that comes with it, cannot go beyond the potential of  his own 
experience. That potential is very wide; but living in a society that has been as deeply 
and calculatedly compartmentalized as South Africa’s has been under the colour bar, the 
writer’s potential has unscalable limitations. There are some aspects of  a black man’s life 
that have been put impossibly beyond the white man’s potential experience, and the same 
applies to the black man and some aspects of  a white man’s experience. Both can write 
of  the considerable fringe society in which black and white are “known,” in a meaningful 
sense, to one another; but there are areas from which, by iron circumstance, each in 
turn finds himself  shut out, even intuitively, to their mutual loss as writers. (52, author’s 
emphases)
In an interview of  the same year Gordimer similarly conceded:
there are some areas of  life white writers can’t enter into, even given the intuitive and 
imaginative powers that writers have. […] when there are certain experiences that are 
outside your potential, that are inconceivable and could never happen to you, then your 
subject matter is restricted to some extent; and it’s restricted in this country with its 
colour bar more than in any other. (Gray and Du Plessis 63)
Nevertheless, despite these qualifications of  her imaginative precocity, Gordimer con-
tinued doggedly to insist on the existence and importance of  the “considerable fringe 
society in which black and white are ‘known,’ in a meaningful sense, to one another”: in 
1962 she says that she has usually written “about the borderland, the kind of  frontier 
where black and white do meet” (Terkel 16, author’s emphasis); in 1980 she similarly 
insists on the literary viability for the white writer of  “vast areas of  actual experience – 
rubbing shoulders with blacks, having all kinds of  relationships with blacks” (Gardner 
168); and in 1982 she declares that when she has written black characters – “dared to 
do it from a black point of  view,” as she tellingly puts it – it “has always been within 
my orbit of  experience, my close experience of  blacks” (Boyers et al. 211; cf. Bazin and 
Seymour 222, 245).
However, Gordimer’s assertion of  the validating power of  experience is problema-
tized by an ambiguity in her description of  that experience’s “potential.” This ambi-
guity is evident in her two-fold description of  the limitation of  the white writer who 
“cannot go beyond the potential of  his own experience” from which is missing “aspects 
of  a black man’s life […] impossibly beyond the white man’s potential experience,” 
and latent in her description of  “certain experiences that are outside your potential, 
that are inconceivable and could never happen to you”: the difference is between one’s 
108
potential experience (experiences that one possibly could have in the future, positions 
into which one could imagine oneself  being placed) and the potential of one’s own 
experience (the potential contained within one’s past experiences for imaginative extra-
polation, including projection into positions in which one cannot conceive of  being 
placed). This equivocal notion of  experience’s potential is indicative of  the dual nature 
of  Gordimer’s understanding of  subjectivity, for the conception of  the “other” in 
terms of  one’s own and one’s potential experiences implies a relatively passive sub-
jectivity, whereas the conception of  the “other” by extrapolating from one’s own ex-
periences by virtue of  their innate potential implies a more active subjectivity. (This 
active extrapolation is, indeed, crucial to Gordimer’s definition of  fiction as “a way of  
exploring possibilities present but undreamt of  in the living of  a single life” [“Intro-
duction” 12].) Just as Gordimer’s notion of  the perceptual mode by which experience 
is constituted was equivocal, so too is her notion of  the potential residing in the expe-
rience so constituted. Both equivocations would be exposed by Gordimer’s imagining 
of  a future revolution.
Subjectivity, Alterity, Futurity: July’s People and “The Transport 
of  a Novel”
There is, it seems to us,
At best, only a limited value
In the knowledge derived from experience.
The knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies,
For the pattern is new in every moment
And every moment is a new and shocking
Valuation of  all we have been.
(T.S. Eliot, “East Coker” 199)
“How was she to have known, until she came here [...]” (Gordimer, July’s People 98)
In July’s People (1981), Gordimer’s conflicting conceptions of  the reach of  the writer’s 
imagination (hyperperceptive or limited), and of  her experience’s potential (contained 
in or contained by the writer’s personal experience), are put under particular pressure 
by their application not just to alterity but also to futurity, an additional and analogous 
problem of  subjective representation that is also posited as a solution to the problem 
of  alterity. Set during a projected black uprising – a “potential experience” which, since 
the 1976 Soweto revolt, was felt to be imminent – July’s People tells the story of  the white 
Smales family who flee their Johannesburg suburb and take refuge in the rural village of  
their black servant, a migrant worker they call July, whose real name is Mwawate. In this 
space-time shift, the othernesses of  the imagined future and the impoverished village 
present challenges that yield fresh socio-political perspectives (on the family’s privileged 
past, and on their former employee), even as the novel expresses philosophical scepti-
cism about such imaginative extrapolation and its textual representation.
While Gordimer’s apartheid-era novels were predominantly set in the near-contem-
porary past, they were implicitly – and, increasingly, explicitly – future-orientated, being 
predicated on revolution. As a speculative fiction set during the predicted revolution, 
July’s People extends and reifies this teleology. Nevertheless, the novel refuses to imag-
ine the revolution itself  and its inevitable violence, which are sketchily evoked by radio 
reports and ambiguously embodied in the helicopter that descends in the final chapter. 
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The novel is also limited in its refusal to imagine what might come after the revolu-
tion, remaining stalled in the “interregnum” adumbrated by its epigraph from Anto-
nio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks: “The old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this 
interregnum there arises a great diversity of  morbid symptoms.” Gordimer would sub-
sequently extend the term “interregnum” backwards from its endgame to encompass 
the whole protracted period between the Soweto uprising and the expected post-apar-
theid settlement (“Living”). In terms of  futurity, A Sport of  Nature (1987), a later Gor-
dimer novel that ranges from the 1950s to the projected inauguration of  a liberated 
South Africa, is marginally more daring than July’s People. Only A Guest of  Honour (1970), 
an earlier novel, projects a nascent postcolonial polity and post-independence strife, 
though its setting in a composite central African state, and one that has very recently 
been a British colony rather than an internally colonized settler republic, complicates 
its implications for South Africa. Gordimer is thus cautious in imagining South Afri-
ca’s revolutionary and post-revolutionary destiny, and July’s People turns back from these 
ineffable limits and inverts its own forward-looking linearity. As Clingman noted, “what 
appears to be a projection from the present into the future in the novel is from another 
point of  view seeing the present through the eyes of  the future” (201-2, author’s emphasis); 
and as Nicholas Visser put it, “the projected revolutionary moment carries a powerful 
defamiliarizing effect, laying bare the underlying social and material conditions of  the 
earlier, prerevolutionary, way of  life” (“The Politics” 70). July’s People is thus both spec-
ulative and peculiarly retrospective – a “future history,” which Michael Green defined 
as “works which seek to comment upon the past and present by projecting the implica-
tions of  the past and the present forward in time” (14).
This temporal manoeuvre is also a spatial one, most fully explored by Rita Barnard: 
“a defamiliarization – effected in Gordimer’s novel through a geographical displace-
ment – […] allows one to see the quotidian practice of  class society as unnatural and 
unjust” (57). The displacement is thus intra-national (from urban to rural) and across 
the nation’s racialized class stratifications (from affluence to poverty), but it might also 
be deemed transnational in the illegitimate terms of  the Bantustan policy that sought to 
exclude black “homelands” from the white state (and so exacerbates the split identity 
of  July/Mwawate), as well as in the temporal sense that the projected South Africa is 
on the cusp of  becoming another country. Transnational displacements afford new 
perspectives on South African society in other Gordimer novels: the thought exper-
iments of  A Guest of  Honour and A Sport of  Nature (which travels to various parts 
of  Africa and Europe); Burger’s Daughter (1979), in which Rosa Burger returns to the 
post-Soweto struggle from a sojourn in France; and The Pickup (2001), in which Julie 
Summers emigrates from post-apartheid South Africa to an unnamed Middle Eastern 
country. Though the transnationalism of  July’s People is problematic and provisional, in 
all five novels new transnational perspectives entail the re-imagining of  black characters 
as agents rather than subalterns.
In July’s People, as Visser’s and Barnard’s comments indicate, the defamiliarizing 
space-time shift enables a devastating critique of  contemporary consumer capitalism 
and liberal humanism. Maureen Smales’s “belief  in the absolute nature of  intimate rela-
tionships between human beings” (64) is displaced by a recognition of  the determining 
power of  “place in the economy” (65). Objects are divested of  their former meanings 
and assume new significances, and subjectivities contingent on material possessions 
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collapse when dispossessed, exemplified by the disintegration of  Bamford Smales, who 
derived his alpha-male identity from his gun and baakie (as suggested by his forename, 
an amalgam of  “bam” and “Ford”; and by his surname’s sibilant prefixing of  “males,” 
which facilitates a diminishing play on “small,” “smalls,” and “snails,” and suffixed to 
his forename suggests that he is more broadly representative of  such hollow masculin-
ity: “bamFord’s males”). The Enlightenment ideal of  equality between human beings 
who are essentially free of  social determinants, and therefore capable of  dispassionate 
observation, is thus undermined. White South African liberalism is exposed as a partic-
ularly deluded and complicit instance of  the ideal, and as incompatible with the Black 
Consciousness philosophy of  self-esteem and self-liberation that provides an essential 
intellectual context despite not being named in the novel (Powell).
This critique is enabled by July’s People’s subversion of  three major literary genres: 
the castaway novel (Titlestad and Kissack), especially Robinson Crusoe (1719; see Meda-
lie); the imperial romance (Greenstein); and “the Countryman-Comes-to-Town theme,” 
which Gordimer lists as one of  “five main […] themes” in African literature (The Black 
Interpreters 33). In particular, July’s People inverts the white liberal paternalist version of  
“the Countryman-Comes-to-Town theme,” the so-called “Jim-Comes-to-Jo’burg” nar-
ratives epitomised by Alan Paton’s Cry, the Beloved Country (1948). Gordimer’s inversion, 
in which a black migrant “Jim” challenged by city life is replaced by urban white refu-
gees confounded by the countryside, is foreshadowed by The Conservationist (1974), in 
which Johannesburg mining-magnate Mehring has his complacent proprietorship of  a 
highveld hobby-farm undermined by the discovery there of  a black corpse that refuses 
to stay buried.
As well as these intertextual revisions, July’s People poses more fundamental questions 
about books, particularly regarding the relevance of  fiction and the reliability and effi-
cacy of  nonfiction. For Sonny, the bibliophile revolutionary of  My Son’s Story (1990), 
which appeared almost a decade later, books are a “source of  transcendence – a way out 
of  battered classrooms, the press of  Saturday people, the promiscuity of  thin-walled 
houses, and at the same time back into them again with a deeper sense of  what the life 
in them might mean” (17). For Maureen, however, such “transcendence” – and hence 
enlightened re-entry – has become impossible. One of  the possessions brought along 
as the family flee is Alessandro Manzoni’s classic historical novel I Promessi Sposi (1827), 
“in translation as The Betrothed” (28):
But the transport of  a novel, the false awareness of  being within another time, place 
and life that was the pleasure of  reading, for her, was not possible. She was in another 
time, place, consciousness; it pressed in upon her and filled her as someone’s breath fills 
a balloon’s shape. She was already not what she was. No fiction could compete with 
what she was finding she did not know, could not have imagined or discovered through 
imagination. (29, author’s emphasis)
A later attempt to achieve “transcendence,” the imaginative “transport” of  immersive 
reading offered by the literal “transport” of  the material book, is similarly stymied by 
Maureen’s new context: “she sat outside the hut and could not understand I Promessi 
Sposi. It was translated from the Italian but would not translate from the page to the 
kind of  comprehension she was able to provide now” (138-9). Manzoni’s “account of  
bread riots in Milan in 1628” begs analogy with the present black South African revolt, 
but in Maureen merely produces “an olfactory impression of  bread” that recalls from 
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her childhood her black nanny Lydia’s indifferent baking (139). Manzoni’s novel, and 
perhaps by extension all novels, seems as obsolete and irrelevant as the passbook that 
July is similarly reluctant to discard (137).
More obviously relevant is a work of  documentary non-fiction specifically about 
South Africa, containing a photograph of  Maureen’s childhood self  with Lydia, which 
Maureen recollects a few pages after first attempting Manzoni’s novel:
Years later someone showed it to Maureen Smales in a Life coffee-table book about 
the country and its policies. White herrenvolk attitudes and life-styles; the marvellous 
photograph of  the white schoolgirl and the black woman with the girl’s school case on 
her head.
Why had Lydia carried her case?
Did the photographer know what he saw, when they crossed the road like that, together? 
Did the book, placing the pair in its context, give the reason she and Lydia, in their 
affection and ignorance, didn’t know? (33)
Gordimer’s second novel, A World of  Strangers (1958), had expressed dissatisfaction with 
similar, often overseas, representations of  South Africa. Englishman Toby Hood arrives 
in Johannesburg to work as a publisher’s agent, measuring his experience of  the place 
against “all those books about Africa [he] had been reading […]. The bluebooks, the 
leaflets, the surveys, the studies – the thick ones by economists and agronomists, the 
sensational ones by journalists” (18); but, as Stefan Helgesson notes of  this novel in 
which “the theme of  print versus place is remarkably pronounced” (110), ultimately 
“history disallows a retreat from the symbolic realm of  print,” which “stages a come-
back” in the final chapter (113) in the form of  “two newspaper cuttings; and a letter” 
the departing Hood carries in his pocket (A World 265). July’s People would similarly seem 
to reassert the power of  print, for though Maureen’s contemplation of  Life’s interpreta-
tion of  the photograph ends with three questions, these are ultimately rhetorical as she 
is “forced to relinquish ‘her role as observer and composer of  the frame’ […], and she 
must recognize her inability to read the visual narrative of  July’s village” (Wright 87).
The questions, however, are less about the adequacy of  print to capture – and inter-
vene in – the experienced place than about the limitations of  experience itself, ma-
king July’s People “Gordimer’s most radical renunciation of  the knowledge yielded by 
observation” (Cooke 168). When July’s wife grumbles that it was unnecessary for the 
burdensome white refugees to flee the city she has never visited, and the killing she 
hasn’t witnessed, July counters: “You can’t imagine those houses. […] Unless you’ve 
been there, you can’t understand how it is” (19); but the Life photograph encapsulates 
the more extreme point that even being “there” – perhaps anywhere – is not enough 
to enable understanding, and may in fact hamper understanding of  broader “context.” 
This is demonstrated by the retrospective revelation not just of  what Maureen “did not 
know” but also, crucially, what she “could not have imagined or discovered through imag-
ination” (emphasis added). The revolution’s “explosion of  roles” (117) that prompts 
her to re-think her childhood relationship with Lydia also forces her into a new unders-
tanding of  her adult master-servant relationship with July, an understanding that would 
not otherwise have been possible: “How was she to have known, until she came here, that the 
special consideration she had shown for his dignity as a man, while he was by definition 
a servant, would become his humiliation itself  [...]” (98, emphasis added). While Wright 
and Cooke are thus correct in affirming that the novel exposes the interestedness and 
unreliability of  observation, what is striking is that the means by which July’s wife might 
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“understand” and Maureen might have “discovered” or “known” things about others’ 
lives is imagination, and that imagination is shown to be contingent on experience. In the 
terms Gordimer deploys in the nonfiction discussed above, Maureen’s pre-revolution 
“experience” was so role-bound that it lacked the “potential” for her to understand July; 
the spatial and temporal displacement of  revolution (a “potential experience” that Gor-
dimer’s speculative fiction makes come to pass) gives Maureen a new experience – “an 
experience that couldn’t be forethought” (127) – that has the “potential” she formerly 
lacked. Futurity is required to enable Maureen’s retrospective understanding of  alterity, 
reflecting a conception of  subjectivity in which epistemology is firmly grounded in 
ontology.
But if  July’s People thus seems to articulate Gordimer’s bleakest view of  subjecti-
vity – as a materially, temporally, and spatially contingent false consciousness – this 
is resisted by the very form in which it is articulated, which suggests a more sanguine 
view: just as A World of  Strangers was itself  a textual representation of  the kind about 
which it expressed reservations, Maureen is herself  an imagined character in a novel of  
the kind that she finds redundant – the kind that does allow discovery through imagina-
tion, not least, paradoxically, those things which Maureen is shown as able to discover 
only through the hindsight acquired by bitter experience. Maureen’s new “experience 
that couldn’t be forethought” has been “forethought,” by Gordimer in hyperperceptive 
mode.
This formal tension between limited and unlimited subjectivities is particularly ap-
parent in Gordimer’s less audacious presentation of  July, which takes up the idea, fore-
grounded by the inclusion of  I Promessi Sposi, of  translation as metaphor and technique. 
July initially speaks to the Smales family in a pidgin arranged in “the servant’s formula, 
attuned to catch the echo of  the master’s concern” (95): “You like to have some cup 
of  tea?” (1). In contrast, conversations with his wife Martha are presented in a stan-
dard English that is signalled as a translation from “their language” (20), Shangaan. 
Elsewhere, Shangaan words and sentences are occasionally included but left untranslat-
ed, as in July’s “teasing and encouraging” (141) words to the gumba-gumba man; for a 
non-Shangaan-speaking Anglophone reader, this reinforces a sense of  otherness, even 
if  the words are susceptible to translation and editorial glossing.1 But when tensions cli-
max with July haranguing Maureen in the “heavy cadences” (152) of  his own language, 
July’s words are not even transcribed, making his reproach at least as inaccessible to the 
reader as it is to Maureen, who feels that “She understood although she knew no word. 
Understood everything: what he had had to be, how she had covered up to herself  for 
him, in order for him to be her idea of  him” (152). Gordimer thus “neither ignores 
July’s story, nor presumes to tell it,” but rather than it “remain[ing] inaccessible to the 
white imagination” (Newman 89) she refracts selected aspects of  his “story” into these 
four linguistic dimensions of  varying accessibility. Though in her epiphanic moment 
Maureen felt that she “understood everything,” the narrative uses the language barrier 
to indicate the limits of  empathy by implying yet withholding what lies beyond those 
limits. July’s People thus suggests that alterity, like futurity, has ineffable limits, for July 
remains almost as unknowable as the post-revolutionary state is unimaginable; but it 
1. The estranging effect of  such moments – and hence July’s otherness – is arguably diminished by Longman’s 
educational edition, which includes English translations in the end-matter’s “Glossary” (Nadine Gordimer, July’s People, 
ed. Jennie Sidney [Harlow: Longman, 1991]).
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also implies that more futurity might enable better understanding of  alterity, which it 
defers to a post-apartheid time. Though Gordimer criticized J.M. Coetzee’s Life & Times 
of  Michael K (1983) – another “future history” set during an imagined South African civil 
war of  uncertain outcome – for its protagonist’s refusal of  history (“The Idea”), her 
representational strategy here is not dissimilar to those of  Coetzee, whose subalterns’ 
opacities and silences resist white liberal desires for knowledge and self-validating reci-
procity.
The famously “open” ending of  July’s People – in which Maureen runs away from 
July’s village, fords a river (imaged as a baptism), and runs towards a helicopter (imaged 
as a rapist), not knowing “whether it holds saviours or murderers; and […] for whom” 
(158) – might also be read in terms of  a tension between the conceptions of  subjec-
tivity that the novel articulates and contrarily embodies. By 1994, when the revolution 
envisaged by July’s People had been averted by the negotiated settlement that brought 
the ANC to power, the meaning of  Maureen’s flight had “become one of  the standard 
debates of  South African fiction” (Green 16). This debate had included perceptive 
analyses by Clingman, who considered that Maureen “is running from old structures 
and relationships [...] but she is also running towards her revolutionary destiny […]. In 
part it is a flight from, but also it is a flight towards” (203), and by Visser, who observed 
that “Maureen has been overtaken by something far larger than herself ” (“Beyond” 
66). These analyses were to remain amongst the most-cited in post-apartheid criticism, 
including Ali Erritouni’s materialist reading of  the novel as a “dystopian critique of  
apartheid” and a non-prescriptive (“postmodern”) projection of  a redistributive “post-
apartheid utopia” (68). The debate as it stood in 2015 was summarized by Jackson: 
“Interpretations run the gamut from apocalyptic to utopian, but they generally share a 
sense of  emergence from the paralysis of  interregnum and of  individualism giving way 
to collective implication” (68). However, building on Brendon Nicholls’s suggestion 
that “Maureen’s detachment from identity, family and community is linked to Gordi-
mer’s belief  in the enlightened distance of  the artist from their society” (33), the reading 
I am proposing shifts the emphasis away from a collective political impetus and back 
towards individual subjectivity and the artistic conundrums confronting the late-apart-
heid writer. In light of  Gordimer’s epistemological and ontological reflection on poten-
tial experiences and experience’s potential, Maureen’s action can be construed as her 
running towards a third phase of  experience that might have the potential to make sense 
of  the second (in July’s village), just as the second proved to have the potential necessary 
to make sense of  the first (in Johannesburg’s suburbs); or, indeed, as her running away 
from such a limiting conception of  subjectivity in which perception is contingent on 
position. Rather than a nebulous political prognosis, Gordimer’s cliffhanger can thus be 
understood as a writerly projection encapsulating the central philosophical paradox of  
a novel that offsets a dystopian conception of  subjectivity, in which experience is deter-
ministic and even tyrannical, by warily endorsing – and, in the end, recklessly embracing 
– a utopian ideal of  subjectivity as heuristic, in which experience has the potential to 
liberate.
If  Gordimer’s self-reflexive examination of  “the transport of  a novel” in terms 
of  its imaginative engagement with alterity and futurity thus remains as unresolved 
as Maureen’s potential physical transport by helicopter, it at least elucidates the diffi-
cult conditions under which, in late-apartheid South Africa, an author’s reach might 
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tentatively exceed her grasp. It also draws attention to “the transport of  a novel” as 
a material object itself  susceptible, in apartheid South Africa and beyond, to situated 
interpretation and retrospective reevaluation. As Andrew van der Vlies suggests in his 
illuminating textual-cultural history of  the book’s publication and reception in different 
editions at home and abroad, July’s People is “an instantiation of  the representations it so 
teasingly offers its readers” (118). As such, its self-reflexive examination of  subjectivity, 
alterity, and futurity – rooted in the unresolved ambivalence about experience’s potential 
apparent in Gordimer’s nonfiction, and reflected in divergent critical assessments of  the 
historical conditioning of  her fiction – should give the reader interpretive pause.
Peter Blair
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